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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEVON PATRICK HARDCASTLE, 
Plaintiff a;nd Appellant, 
vs. 
NELDON HARDCASTL.E, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
and 
ORDELL HARDCASTLE, 
Interpleaded Defendant ,amJ 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF F AC.TS 
Case No. 
7423 
(All Italics, unless otherwise noted, are appellant's.) 
De Von Patrick Hardcastle, plaintiff arid appellant, 
married N eldon Hardcastle, defendant and respondent, 
on November 25, 1942, at which time she was of the 
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age of 14 (R. 86). Subsequently, and on October 28, 
1943, Janet, the minor child of DeVon and N eldon and 
the child involved in this proceeding, was born (Exhibit 
1). A short time prior to the birth of this child, this 
couple had gone to live at the home of Mrs. Ordell 
Hardcastle, interpleaded defendant and respondent, and 
the mother of Neldon, at Salt Lake County, Utah. About 
a month later, on November 23, 1943, and while they 
still lived at this home, N eldon entered the Navy and 
left for that service (R. 172.). 
The controversy as to custody in this case lies be-
tween Ordell Hardcastle, the grandmother of the child, 
and DeVon Hardcastle (now _Oliver) the mother of the 
child. N eldon Hardcastle, the father, does not himself 
seek custody. 
During the six or seven months following the birth 
of Janet, DeVon continued to live at the home of her 
husband's mother, at least for a major portion of the 
time (R. 86). The testimony is not entirely clear, but 
there is an indication that about December 15, 1943, 
she left the Hardcastle home and took the child to the 
home of her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Patrick, in Bingham, 
Utah (R. 217). On DecembeT 29, 1943, she returned 
to the Ordell Hardcastle home, bringing the child with 
her. A short time later, she again took the child to the 
Patrick home in Bingham, Utah (R. 218)'. On April 
15, 1944, De Von took the :child to Bingham, Utah, re-
maining there until May 29, 1944 (R. 218). On the latter 
date, De Von again brought the child back to the o:rdell 
Hardcastle home, where she remained until July 12, 
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1944 (R. 264). The reason that De Von returned to the 
Ordell Hardcastle home in May, 1944, was that her 
father, Mr. Patrick, objected to the crying of the child 
in his home at night, and had threatened her and the 
baby and had beaten her (R. 271,172, 173). 
About July 12, 1944, a quarrel occurred at the Hard-
castle home between De Von and a child of Ordell Hard-
castle who was living at the home, and, in the resulting 
argument, De Von was asked- to leave (R. 264, 86). 
DeVon then went to Riverton, Utah, where she 
stayed at the home of Mrs. Wayne Brown (R. 87). for 
about two weeks, when she went to Portland, Oregon 
(R. 107). DeVon was 15 years old at this time. Ordell 
Hardcastle testified on direct examination that at no 
time between July, 1944 and August, 1948 was any de-
mand made by De Von for the custody of the child 
(R. 231). On cross examination, however, she stated that 
one week after DeVon had gone to the Brown's and just 
after Mrs. Brown had returned from the hos!pital, DeVon 
entered the Hardcastle home late at night and attempted 
to take the child with her, stating that she wa.s not only 
going to take her, but was going to keep the child (R. 265). 
Ordell Hardcastle refused to let the child go, and stated 
that a sheriff would be required to take the child away 
(R. 265, 266). 
De Von then went to Sheriff George Beckstead and 
told him she was going to have the child (R. 267). On 
another occasion, while De Von was staying at the 
Brown's, Ordell Hardcastle and her husband went to 
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that home in company with the child to deliver an allot-
ment check received from Neldon. Again, DeVon de-
manded her child, which demand was refused, and a 
physical struggle ensued he tween DeVon and the Hard-
castles, following which they took the .child to the Hard-
castle home ( R.. 279). 
A tender of proof was made hy appellant to show 
that during this two week period, DeVon had a conver-
sation with Sheriff George Beckstead, a relative of the 
Hardcastles, who told her that she could not have 
custody of the child, which she believed (R. 88). The 
tender was rej~cted by the court, although made for 
the narrow purpose of showing the attitude of DeVon 
toward the child ( R. 88, 89). 
After leaving the Brown residence in Riverton, 
Utah, DeVon went to Portland, o:regon, where she was 
employed as a welder in the Kaiser shipyards, remaining 
there until the latter part of December, 1944. At this time, 
she lived in a ship~yard. dormitory where there were no 
facilities to care for a child (R. 111). During this period, 
she testified that she wrote Ordell H·ardcastle every two 
weeks, and en.closed s·ome money for the child with each 
letter (R. 109). Or dell Hardcastle denied receiving 
letters direetly addressed to her, or receiving money, 
although there was corresp·ondence with other members 
of the family living in the h·ouseh·old (R .. 270), and some 
money was received (R. 270). 
A petition relative to the custody of th'e child was 
filed in the juvenile court of the !S:econd Juvenile Dis-
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trict for Salt Lake County, on September 13, 1944, and 
an order entered on Sep,tember 19, 1944, granting cus-
tody of the child to Ordell Hardcastle. De 'Ton, however, 
received no notice, was not advised of the pendency of 
this juvenile court action relative to custody, and did 
not learn of the existence of such an order until she 
was consulting her attorney J. Patton Neeley relative 
to a divorce, in May, 1946 (R. 109, 110, 111, 122). Dur-
ing this period while De Von was in Portland, some 
difficulty had arisen relative to the allotment which had 
been executed by Neldon who was still in the Navy. 'The 
Red Cross had asked her to sign some document so that 
the Judge would get the money directly, although she 
did not know of any custody hearing or difficulty (R. 
122). 
In early 1945 or after Christmas of 1944, D-eVon 
moved to San Diego, California, where she remained 
until her divorce from Neldon in May, 1946. During this 
period there was correspondence between DeVon and 
other members of the Hardcastle household in Utah, 
photographs of the ·child were sent, and requests and 
information relative to the child made and received 
(R. 269, 270, 271). 
In May of 1946, De Von was working as a .car hop 
in a drive-in at San Diego, at wages of $24.00 per week 
(R. 90). She had just turned 18, was living with her 
mother Laura Patrick,. in Frontier Housing, a war 
housing project, in a two bedroom apartment of four 
rooms and one bath. Also living in the apartment were 
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her sister Jean Mullin, and her brother, Gary, age 13 
(R. 91). This sister, who was a year and 9 months 
older than DeVon, was seriously ill at this time (R. 95) 
from the effects of chronic nephritis, chronic necrosis, 
high blood pressure, and kidney trouble. Hospital and 
medical bills were very high and very much of a pro-
blem. Mrs. Patrick worked during the day at the Naval 
Air Station, North Island, at a wage of $35.00 per week 
from 7:00 to 3:00p.m. (R. 143). DeVon was working 
at night, leaving for that work when Mrs. Patrick 
reached home from her employment. Between these two 
women and the younger brother they were able to keep 
someone with the ill sister ·during all of the time, as this 
was esssential and they were not able to afford a nurse 
(R. 143). Both Mrs. Patrick and DeVon testified that 
it was utterly impossible to have Janet with them during 
this time because of the illness, financial_ difficulties, 
and housing accomodatiQns (R. 141, 98). DeVon at this_ 
time was contributing all that she could to the care, 
nursin_g and medical expenses of her sister. 
N eldon was discharged from the service in 194·5, and 
in May, 19·46, De Von returned to Salt Lake City, Utah, 
in conne-ction with divorce proceeding which she then 
instituted. The complaint asked that the custody of the 
child be awarded to Ordell Hardcastle (R. 2) and the 
decree of May 8, 1946 so provided (R. 8). The divorce 
was entered upon default of defendant, Neldon (R. 4). 
·De Von, however, thought that in signing the complaint 
she was not signing ·J·anet away and understood that the 
district court would follow the Juvenile Court's 'decision 
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until such time as she could come back and show that 
she was then able to take care of Janet ( R. 100). DeVon 
viewed the custody arrangement whereby the child was 
placed with Ordell Hardcastle as temporary, and until 
she could herself properly care for the child (R. 104). 
On November 9, 1946, DeVon married Richard L. 
Oliver, an official of the American Processing Company 
of San Diego, California (R. 74), and from that time 
to the present he has continued his employment, with an 
interest in that company. His income, at the ·date of 
the hearing herein, was $900.00 per month, coupled with 
a 15 per cent stock interest which had produced $6,000.00 
dividends in the preceding year (R. 75). Exhibit A is a 
picture of their present home, purchased at a cost of 
$36,500.00. The home is located in an excellent residen-
tial district in Mt. Helix, near San Diego, well fur-
nished, and a separate bedroom is available for Janet. 
Two blocks from the home is a community playground 
with a number of desirable playground facilities for 
children, schools are of good quality and ·conveniently 
located nearby, and the same is true as to the location 
of churches. Children of the same age as Janet are 
close by. Mr. Oliver, age 32, present husband ·of De Von, 
is acquainted with the child, having seen her on a num-
ber of occasions. He was most anxious that custody be 
awarded to DeVon and that the minor child, Janet, be 
permitted to live with them. Another child has been 
born to the Olivers, a son age three months at the time 
of the hearing. Mr. Oliver, moreover, state·d that he 
would contemplate a college education for Janet (R. 
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80, 81). No children of Ordell Hardcastle had gone to 
college, and she apparently did not anticipate the ne-
cessity of Janet doing so (R. 250). 
Mrs. Nona Archibald, aunt of De Von, had visited 
the Olivers in their home in San Diego, and testified 
that De Von, then Mrs. Oliver, was very much in love 
with her husband, and that they were devoted to each 
other (R. 137, 138). This mutual affection and under-
standing was also confirmed by Mrs. Laura Patrick, 
who described the gardens and grounds of the Oliver 
home, its pleasant furnishings, and the wholesome and 
well-ordered home in which Janet will live in the event 
the custody is awarded to her natural mother (R. 139, 
140). 
Following the Oliver marriage, De Von continued to 
keep in touch with the Hardcastle household so far as 
Janet was concerned, seeing the child on such occasions 
as she was in Utah, and giving her, through Mrs. Patrick, 
gifts and sm~ll articles of clothing from time to time. 
De Von did not make any scheduled cash contributions to 
Ordell Hardcastle for the .child. In August, 1948, she 
instituted p·roceedings before the Salt Lake County Ju-
venile Court to secure the custody of Janet, and a hear-
ing was commenced on August 13, 1'948, before that 
Court. That hearing was not completed, and the parties 
then stipulated to transfer the cause to the District 
Court, app,arently in view of the jurisdictional p~roblems, 
and in this the Juvenile Judge agreed (R. 65 to 73). 
At the time of the hearing herein, Judge Rulon Clark of 
the Juvenile Court, in speaking of the order of that 
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Court, stated, ''The Juvenile Court is prepared to re-
lease custody to the District Court, to determine custody, 
since the District Court already had custody in the 
divorce matter. Ours was a temporary situation to tide 
over until some other arrangement was made.'' 
Mrs. Laura Patrick eventually returned to Bingham, 
Utah. Thereafter she visited the minor child, Janet, 
at the Hardcastle home in Sandy, Utah, about once a 
month until about June of 1948, at which time she 
ceased the visits because of her knowledge of the in-
tended custody hearing (R. 147). During this period of 
time, she stated that Janet was uniformly dirty on the 
occasion of these visits, needed clean clothes and a ba.th, 
and that the Hardcastle home was littered and 
that the yard was likewise littered and dirty (R. 147, 
148). About October, 1948, Earl Lowry visited the Hard-
castle home. He stated he found the yard with the gen-
eral appearance of a junk yard, and a trailer located 
near t}_le house in which people were living ( R. 128, 129). 
He also stated that in the house everything was on the 
floor, the table, or on a chair, with nothing put away 
(R. 129). Similar conditions of the home and of Janet 
and her clothes were noted by De Von when she visited 
the child, particularly in August, 1'948. The child aa;>,par-
ently had no shoes at this time (R. 116). 
At the time of the hearing herein, the Hardcastle 
home was occupied by o:rdell Hardcastle an·d her hus-
band, together with her children, Anita age 18, Raymond 
age 15, Ernest age 11, and Glenda age 8, in addition to 
the child Janet (R. 237). The house is situated on an 
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80 acre farm which had been improved prior to the 
hearing by the addition of inside water, and apparently 
the Hardcastles had plans to put in a bathtub and bath-
room fixtures, and there had also been some minor al-
terations ( R. 236, 237). The house is located in a typical 
farm area with adjacent houses some distance away, 
the closest being about one city block (R. 247). The 
closest school is 1% miles away, at Crescent, Utah (R. 
192). In the home, Janet was occupying a rooD?- with 
the other two children. 
Ordell Hardcastle was age 47 and her husband age 
50 (R. 252). Mr. Hardcastle worked at the :Smelter at a 
salary of about $300.00 per month,·and there was appar-
ently little, if any, income from .the farm itself, or at 
least had been none during the year p.rior to the hearing 
(R. 252). The work on the farm itself done by Ordell 
Hardcastle and the children, with some hired assistance, 
Mr. Hardcastle having injured his back some years prior 
and not being able, apparently, to do any farm work 
(R. 254, 255). There was testimony on behalf of the 
Hardcastles that if the child were dirty at times it was 
only the normal condition of a child on a farm, and that 
Janet was cleaned up and her clothes in normal condition 
upon proper ·occasion. 
There was testimony in behalf of respondents that 
the child was well and happy, and that a strong affection 
existed between Ordell Hardcastle and the ~hild. It also 
appeared that at the time of the Juvenile Court hearing 
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in 1948 and prior thereto, Janet was upset and nervous, 
that she did not want to go to California, and had cried 
going to the hearing and in the Juvenile courtroom. 
The first intimation, however, of the :po.ssible result 
of that Juvenile Court hearing, was given to the child by 
a former neighbor of the Hardcastles, Mr. Jackson, who 
asked Janet in July of 1948 whether she would like to go 
to California (R. 275). Ordell Hardcastle made no at-
tempt to explain in any way the then p~rospective hear-
ing or the nature of it, although some mention was later 
made about going to C-alifornia (R. 277), and an officer 
served papers on the H·ardcastle family, and J·anet knew 
of this (R. 277). Neldon Hardcastle, the child's father, 
had never mentioned the hearing or custody in any way 
to the child (R. 189, 192). He had, by the time of the 
hearing herein, remarried, and was living at Lark, Utah, 
visiting his mother and the child about once each week 
(R. 17 4). He does not, himself, seek custody of the child. 
Janet, the testimony shows, is a 'child who easily 
adjusts herself and makes friends readily, and is in fact 
possessed of a happy-go-lucky disposition (R. 205, 206), 
getting along well with other children and adults (R. 
213, 248). 
The petition herein for modification of decree was 
filed on November 19, 1948, ·and the decree denying the 
same made and entered on July 11, 1949. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT NO.1 
The trial c.ourt erred in awarding custody of the 
minor child, Janet Hardcastle, to her grandmother, 
Ordell Hardcastle, and sueh finding was contrary to the 
la:w and the evidence, in that said custody should have 
been awarded to the natural mother of said child, De Von 
Patrick Hardcastle. 
POINT NO.2 
The trial court erred in m·aking and entering para-
graph 2 of Finding of Fact No. 1, and paragraph 2. of 
Finding of Fact No. 2, there being no eviden;ce to support 
the same and said findings being contrarY to the evi-
dence. 
POINT NO.3 
The trial court erred in making and entering para-
graph 3 of Finding of F~ct No. 3, there being no evi-
dence to support the same and s·aid finding being con-
trary to_ the evidence. 
POIN'T No·. 4 
The trial court erred in making and entering Find 
ing of Fact No. 6, there being no evidence to support the 
same and said finding being contrary to the evidence. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 
This point is directed to the order of the trial court, 
denying the p~etition for modification of decree and 
awarding custody of the minor child, Janet Hardcastle, to 
respondent Ordell Hardcastle. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of any 
ground upon which the action of the trial judge can be 
justified. There is, in the first instance, very clear and 
convincing evidence of substantial change in conditions 
between the time of the entrance of the the divorce 
decree awarding custody to Ordell Hardcastle in May, 
1946, and the time of the petition herein on N ovembe·r 
19, 1948. 
At the time that divorce decree was entered on de-
fault, the natural mother of the child and app·ellant herein 
was living with her own Mother in ·San Diego under 
what can only be described as onerous circumstances. 
Single, she was in the first place very clearly compelled 
to work, which she did as a car hop at a salary of $25.00 
per week. Her mother was employed at -a slightly in-
creased salary. The apartment in which they were liv-
ing, a war housing p·roject, had only two bedrooms, and 
in those two bedrooms were living four people, three 
adults and one boy. Arrangements might have been 
possible whereby a very young baby could have entered 
the home with proper care, except for the fact that 
DeVon's older sister was seriously ill and in need of 
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constant medical and nursing attention. This not only com-
plicated things from a housing standpoint, it required 
that De Von be employed at night so that she could be 
with her sister during the daytime hours when her 
mother was working, and it drained the financial abilities 
of all concerned to practically a subsistanee level, not 
only were there living expens,es in a war boom town, on 
meager incomes, but the drugs, medical, and hospital care 
were a very real financial drain. If any mother was ever 
confronted with a situation not of her own making which 
made it utterly impossib~e to properly care for and main-
tain a baby, DeVon Hardcastle was so confronted in 
May, 1946. 
What were the circumstances by August or N ovem-
ber, 1948? By that time the sister had 'died of the 
illness from which she had previously suffered. DeVon 
had remarried and was now Mrs. Richard Oliver. There 
were no financial problems of any kind. Her husband, 
fortunately, was a relatively wealthy man with an income 
of about $1,400.00 per month. They had a home in an 
exclusive residential district, with more than adequate 
facilities and surrounding to prrop·erly care for a child. 
DeVon's hours were not occupied with nursing or work; 
she was free to care for and love her child in a congenial 
and happy home environment. All of the factors, which 
were of the most compelling nature and had p.revented 
her from keeping and properly caring for the child, had 
disappeared. It is difficult to conceive of a more radical 
change in :conditions than that which occurred in those 
few years, particularly as it affected DeVon's ability to 
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15 
care for her child as well as the welfare of that child 
while in her custody. 
It will be noted that the fina11;cial ability of the 
mother is one of the most important factors which en-
tered into _the change in circumstances, though not the 
only one. Appellant is fully aware of the fact that in 
many cases financial ability is viewed with limited con-
cern where both parties in a custody case have means 
to provide for a child. In such instances, some courts 
have iridicated that the fact, standing alone, that 
one parent, for exainple, has an income four times that of 
the Other parent, does not mean that the parent with the 
higher .income should be entitled to the cu_stody of the 
chil~. Where, however, that income is at such a level th'at 
coupled with other circumstances it l!leans the difference 
between the ability to provide and ~ot to- provide for a 
child, then we believe it beco~es a dominaitt factor in a 
custody case, such ·as is here involved. 
The authorities indicate, as common sense dictates, 
that in any custody case the real an·d primary concern 
lies in a determination of the arrangement which will 
be in the ultimate best interests of the child. 'This trans-
cends any other consideration, and while it is true in 
one sense that each case must be governed by its own 
facts, it is also true that there are ·certain principles of 
decision which have been repeatedly asserted. Su.ch for 
example, as. the concept that it is in the best interests 
of any small child that it be reared by its natural mother. 
This comes not so much from what might be termed 
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statutory law, as it does from centuries of human ex-
perience in such matters. 
In Schneider v. Batey, 157 A. 739, the decision of 
the trial judge was reversed and the child awarded to 
its natural mother on a modification proceeding. The 
basis of the decision is indicated at page 7 41 in the 
following language: 
''While Miss Hasson is a greataunt, and 
loves the child, and desires the solace of her .com-
pany, by force of natural law she cannot take 
the 'place of a mother, nor love the child so fondly 
nor crave its society so strongly as a young 
mother does her only offspring. The enforced 
separation of the mother will deprive the child 
of that close and intimate association which is 
the most precious possession and enriching ex-
p·erience of childhood; and by placing the child 
under the protection of a g'reataunt who, in point 
of time is further removed by a generation than 
the mother, will probably either deprive the child 
of the greataunt's guidance and protection at the 
·most critieal period of the greatniece's life or then 
burden the child with premature responsibility. 
Unless there is some strong ground to the con-
trary, the natural association of mother and 
child should prevail and not be diverted to that 
of greataunt and greatniece. Gillett v. Bryant, 
203 Ill. A pp. 322.'' 
''The divorce of the ·parents was not the fault 
of the p·etitioner on this record and the surrender 
of the child to the custody of' the greataunt was 
not because of a desire on the part of the mother 
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to be relieYed of her maternal duty, but was be-
cause she \Yas compelled to earn her living, and 
she could not \York and keep her infant. The 
necessity to give up her child did not lessen the 
mother's love for h'er child or cause her to lose 
interest in its \velfare. As soon as she was able 
properly to care for the child, she sought to get 
her ·back. She and her present husband are of 
good character, and are suitable persons to have 
the charge of the child, and are able to provide 
for her in a manner conforming to the child's 
station in life. These and the other considerations 
that have been set forth in this opinion make it 
clear that the course most beneficial to the child's 
welfare and happiness is to restore the daughter 
to the care and custody of the mother, who is 
willing to assume, and so may be charged with, 
the maintenance and support of the child. 
Barnard v. Godfrey, 157 Md. 264, 271, 272, 145 A. 
614. As this conclusion is not in accord with the 
decree from which the ap})eal is prayed, the cause 
will have to be remanded.'' 
In awarding custody to the natural mother, the 
court in Barnhart v. B·arnhart, 253 S. W. 56, stated at 
page 58: 
''The effect of this act is to place the father 
and mother upon an equal footing as to their right 
to have the care and custody of their minor 
children. The welfare of the child should govern 
and is the supreme consideration. The child's 
custody should not be awarded for the mere pur-
pose of gratifying the feelings and wishes of one 
parent as against the other, as either p·unish-
ment or reward. It is 'contended by defendant 
that the child i~ contented a.nd happy and, has a 
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good: ho1]t-e with its paterna~ gr.a;rul;p~ren~s; that 
they love' the child, ·and he lov_es them a~d would 
be ·distressed d;nd ·unhappy to leave them. How·-
ever, these :are matters ·that ~ay no·t enter into 
the solution of the· quest~on u;ith ~ny determining 
weight." · 
• • =If: • 
' 'Of the attitude of the father and his inten-
tion to ~eave the child with its grandparents, we 
can only say that this course would be to deprive 
the child of the love and care of both parents, 
during its young and tender years. Against this 
we have the assurance or plaintiff that she wants 
the boy ·and will take him and· care for him as 
his mother, and·herhusband,who·is shown by the 
evidence to be·· a good man, j-oins her in this re-
quest. They are both young and physically and 
financially able to care ~properly for the child. 
· The· boy is of tender ·years and should not at this 
time, if' ·ever, be _·deprived of the loving care and 
tender affection of a mother. The grandp·arents 
are shown to be good people, but in their affec-
tion; they· cannot" take the place of the mother. 
We thin~ it unnecessary to go into the. compara-
tive merits of ·city and country schools. Should 
they offer equal advantages to the child, we think 
he should 'be returned to the arms and heart of 
his mother, under the authorities above cited .... '' 
Again in H ig ginboth(JJJn v. Loft!on, 164 So. 25·5, the 
judgment of the trial court was reversed and the child 
awarded to its mother. The court stated at page 256: 
''Plaintiff instituted suit against defendant 
for a· divorce on the grounds of adultry and 
judgment was rendered in her favor on May ?4, 
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1929, but the defenda~t was granted the per-
manent custody' of . his minor son~ It appears 
that this action was taken by the court because 
of the inability of the plaintiff to pr~vide a hon1e 
for her ·c.hild, and becaus·e she consented, in writ-
ing to let the father have the child.' Later, both 
the plaintiff and the defendant entered into 
second marriages, plaintiff marrying a nian wh·q 
had a small . son and defendant now has a child 
by his second wife. Defendant and his wife and 
chilq of his second marriag~ are also living with 
his grandparents. · . · · .· · 
''It is contended that the mother should not 
be gr~nted the custody of the child, because sh~ 
abandoned it when it was about nine months old 
and agreed, in writing, as -well as in one of the 
, allegations in her p·etition for divorce, to give 
the custody of the child to the father. We are con-
vinced that circumstances over which she had no 
control. compelled her to make that sacrifice, 
because of her extreme youth and inability to 
provide for the child. Furth·ermore, the record 
is conclusive that as soon as she was in a position 
to afford a comfortable home for the child, she 
repe_atedly requested that she be given ~possession 
of her minor son. We are satisfie9. that she 
yielded to pleas of the great grandparents not 
to disturb the child, because of their deep affec-
tion for it, and delayed bringing the matter to 
an issue.'' 
See also Williams v. Guynes, 97 S. W. 2d 988; Lame 
v. La;ne, 186 S. W. 2d 47; Spr.att v. Spratt, 187 N. W. 
227; Hugetr v. Huger, 20 N. W. 2d 848; Valentine v. 
Valentine, 118 P. 2d 17. 
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Utah decisions are in accord with those of other 
states, and clearly recognize that the real problem in a 
custody case centers on an award which will be in the 
best interests of the child. Prior to the decision in 
Sampsell v. Holt, 202 P. 2d 550, there apparently had 
been some understanding among the bench and bar of 
this state who believed that Sec. 40-3-10 U.C.A. gave to 
the mother an absolute right to the custody of a minor 
child, without regard to the best interest of the child. 
That decision held that this section applied only to 
cases of separation, and not to divorce. We submit that 
this decision in the final analysis made little practical 
change and did no violence to previously established con-
cepts. The court was careful to emphasize the equitable 
nature of custody proceedings, and to point out that 
the best interests and welfare of the minor child con-
trol. Thus at page 553 : 
''Child custody proceedings are equitable in 
the highest degree, and this court has consistently 
held that the best interest and welfare of the 
minor child is the controlling factor in every case. 
Walton v. Coffman, 110 Utah 1, 169 P. 2d 97, and 
cases there cited. Such proceedings being equi-
table, we may review the facts as well as the law 
l " on appea .... 
The facts of Walton v. Coffman, 110 Utah 1, 169 
P. 2d 97, (1946) are far removed from those with which 
we are here concerned. That case, however, makes a 
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detailed analysis of earlier Utah decisions, and sum-
marizes the law applicable to custody cases. At p·a.ge 
102: 
''We conclude that the determining consider-
ation in cases of this kind is: What will be for 
the best interest and welfare of the child~ That 
in determining this question there is a presump-
tion that it will be for the best interest and wel-
fare of the child to be reared under the care, 
custody, and control of its natural parent; that 
this presumption is not overcome unless from 
all of the evidence the trier of the facts is sa tis-
fled that the welfare of the child requires that it 
be awarded to someone other than its natural 
parent. Thus the ultimate burden of proof on 
this question is always in favor of the parent 
and against the other person. 
''In addition thereto this ·presumption, being 
based on logic and natural inference, should be 
kept in mind by the trier of the facts and weighed 
and considered with all the other evidence in 
determining this question. The common exper-
ience of mankind teaches ''that blood is thicker 
than water,'' that usually there is a much strong-
er attachment between a natural parent and child 
than is developed between the child and a foster 
parent, that ordinarily the natural parent is will-
ing to sacrifice its own interest and welfare for 
the benefit of the child much more than is the 
case with foster parents and that generally the 
natural parent is more sympathetic and under-
standing and better able to get the confidence and 
love of its own child than any one else, all of these 
things are especially true of the natural mother. 
That these facts should always be kept in mind 
throughout the trial and given due weight along 
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with all the other evidence in the case in deter-
mining. what will be for the best interest and 
welfare of the child. However, this presumption 
is one of fact and not of law, and may be over-
come by any competent evidence which is suffi-
cient to satisfy a reasonable mind thereon." 
The case of Briggs v. Briggs, 111 Utah 418, 181 P. 
2d 223, was decided prior to Sampsell v. Holt, supra, 
but as the court in that latter case pointed out, the rule 
of law actually app,lied was that of awarding custody in 
accordance with the best interests of the child. In this 
decision, in confirming the award of the child to the 
mother, the court commented upon the fact that for 
almost two years prior to the hearing the child had not 
been with the mother. At page 228: 
''We do not here have to determine the cor-
rect construction of this statute because under 
defendant's own construction he cannot succeed. 
We are not unimpressed with the strong affection 
existing between the defendant and this child, 
with the care and attention he gave her while he 
had her with him, with the fact that his present 
wife is devoted to and has won the love and re-
spect of this little gir 1 and that all of them were 
living happily together and were adjusted to each 
other and their home. But we cannot overlook 
the fact that at the time of the trial the child had 
been living with he.r father and had not lived 
with her mother in twenty-one months, and that 
this situation was the result of his own deliberate 
taking of the child from the state where the 
mother lived without disclosing their whereabouts 
to her. During that time he had the opportunity 
to ingratiate himself in the affections of his child 
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and to cause the shortcomings of the mother to 
become exaggerated in the child's mind. It is im-
possible for us to tell how the child would feel 
toward her mother had she had the opportunity 
of associating with her during that time. Under 
this statute the mother is entitled to the custody 
of the child unless it is made to appear to the 
contrary. Thus the burden of convincing the 
court is on the father. We must ·also kee1p in m.ind 
that ()trdinarily no ·one can take the place of a 
mother in the ~ife of a girl of this age. In view 
of all of the facts and circumstances presented 
we are not convinced that the best interests of 
this child requires that the mother be dep,rived 
of her custody an·d she be awarded to her 
father .... " 
See also Baldwin v. Nielson, 110 Utah 172, 170 P. 
2d 179, and on rehearing, 110 Utah 180, 174 P. 2d 437. 
Against the background of these authorities, and 
in the application of common sense, it seems abundantly 
clear that the future welfare and ultimate best interest 
of the child involved in this case lies in an award of 
custody to her natural mother. All factors point to this 
end. 
In the first instance we are dealing with relation-
ship of natural mother and child, as contrasted to that 
of grandmother and granddaughter. The authorities 
generally, and a number have been cited above, strongly 
recognize that from the child's standpoint a natural par-
ent, and particularly a mother, is the one best suite'd to 
care for and rear a minor girl. In Walton v. Coffman, 
supra, the court points out the experience and consider-
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a tions which under line the validity of this rule, and also 
that there is a presumption to this effect. It is, more-
over, the burden of anyone seeking to overcome this pre-
sumption to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the welfare of the child ''requires'' that it be 
awarded to someone other than the natural parent. 
Janet is now six years old, and entitled to grow up 
and mature in the care of someone who is reasonably 
close to the age of a normal parent. In Sch!ne'ider v. 
B~atey, supra, the court went to some length to point out 
the advantages to the child in a proper age relationship. 
When Janet reaches 16 and is at a point in life when 
maternal guidance and assistance is of such vital im-
portance, her grandmother will he 58 and her grand-
father 61. As Janet advances beyond 16, the disparity 
becomes even more marked. At 26, Janet would normally 
have many years remaining of association with her par-
ent in a normal family unit. Yet at this point, the grand-
mother will be 68 and the grandfather 71, if they are 
actually living at that time. On the other hand, when 
Janet is 16, her mother will be 31, and at 26 the mother, 
41. If the mother is dep.rived of the child at this time, 
it may be that there will be some affection and love be-
tween them when that child reaches maturity since this 
is the natural result of the relationship of mother and 
child. It can only be casual if it ever exists, because 
during the plastic and impressionable years of that 
child's life the present order would deny her the com-
panionship and guidance of her mother. This is neither 
law, nor logic. 
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There can be no doubt that DeVon is a fit and 'p~rop.er 
person to have her child, and has the facilities at her 
disposal to properly :care for Janet. At this time, she is 
living in a home located in an exclusive residential dis-
trict where there are other children nearby, and where 
churches, playgrounds, and schools are in close prox-
imity. The record details, for example, the nature and 
desirability of a nearby community, though privately 
financed, playground. Janet will have her own room, 
and will not he compelled to sleep in the same room with 
her grandparents. She will certainly receive a better 
education, and Mr. Richard Oliver testified in detail as 
to his abilities and desires to provide a college education 
for Janet and his other child. Mrs. 0-rdell Hardcastle, 
on the other hand, viewed a high school education as 
adequate or at least within the limit of her financial 
ability, and that is the extent of provision she has made 
for any of her other children. There is no reason why 
Janet should be denied this education. 
It is also clearly apparent that the Oliver home itself 
is ideal in every respect. There is a deep and abiding 
affection between DeVon and her second husband, they 
are happy and well suited, considerate of each other, 
and are both anxious to have Janet assume her rightful 
place in that home. There is a small baby as the result of 
this second marriage, and every reason to believe there 
will be more children. This home is where Janet belongs 
and should be, in a young and growing family, and not 
in a household where many of the children have reached 
and passed maturity, and where the increasing infirm-
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ities of age must soon come to those in charge of that 
household. 
The attitude of the ·mother to the child is o£ vital 
importance to this case, and can only be adequately de-
termined by a consideration of events p,rior to the en-
trance of the divorce decree herein. This is particularly 
true in view of the fact that the custody was awarded 
to Ordell Hardcastle on a petition of the mother speci-
ficatly requesting such an award, and a default divorce 
wherein the judge presumably neither made, nor was 
called upon to make, a thorough investigation of the 
previous oc,currences so far as the child was concerned. 
At the time the child was born, De Von was 15 years 
old, and little more than a child herself. It was not too 
long after the birth of Janet, that her husband Neldon 
left for the service, and the mother and child thrown 
upon the resources of a family of limited financial means. 
She took the child to Bingham to the home of her own 
parents, where the child at least was not welcome. The 
baby was only a few months old at this time. ffitimately, 
she was asked to leave the Hardcastle home where fric-
tion developed, and she then went to the Brown's in 
Riverton, Utah. At this time she tried to take the baby 
from the Hardcastle home at night, was prevented from 
so doing, and advised by Ordell that it would take a 
sheriff to accomplish that removal. De Von apparently 
did contact the sheriff, and a few days later tried to get 
her baby from the Hardcastles when they brought an 
allotment check to Riverton. In the resulting physical 
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struggle, she was unable to get the baby and it was taken 
back to the home of the Hardcastles. There certainly 
is every indication in these facts that De Von wanted 
her child and wanted to try and take care of it, and that 
her intentions toward the child were those of a normal 
mother. Therein lies the importance of this testimony. 
To an adult mother the situation might well have ap'-
peared hopeless, and it certainly would have so ap·peared 
to a girl of 15 years. Her husband was gone, her own 
parents would not accept her and the child, and there 
was friction in the home of her husband's family. 
All during the period of time while she was working 
in the shipyards in Portland and later while she was 
employed and living at her mother's home in San Diego, 
DeVon was interested in and concerned about the child. 
She corresponded, and sent presents to the ,child. A 
Kaiser shipyard dormitory was scarcely a place for the 
child, and the conditions in the ho:rp.e at San Diego were 
little improvement. 
It was while DeVon was in Portland that the diffi-
culty arose over the allotment check of N eldon Hard-
castle, her husband, and it was at this time that the juve-
nile court order was entered. Whatever may have been 
the legal effect of this order, we believe the record is 
clear that DeVon did not understand that any formal 
order taking the custody of her child was involved. She 
testified to this several times and categorically stated 
that the first knowledge she had of that order was at the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
time of obtaining her divorce. Judge Clark of the Juve-
nile Court viewed the order as a temporary matter until 
other arrangements could be made. 
At the time the divorce decree was entered, De Von 
was under the distinct impression that it was. a tempor-
ary arrangement and that. at such time as she was able 
to properly care for the child it would be returned to 
her. For the reasons which we have indicated above, 
it was utterly impossible for her to take care of the child 
at this time in view of her sister's illness and the other 
factors existing at San Diego at that time. There was 
only one logical thing to do at that particular time and 
that was to leave the child with Ordell Hardcastle on a 
temporary basis, and this custody arrangement was not 
a m·atter of proper choice but one of forced circum-
stances, so far as DeVon was concerned. 
Ultimately, however, De Von remarried, acquired a 
home and when she was settled in that home she initiated 
formal proceedings, as she was forced to do, to obtain 
the custody of her child. This hearing was the re~ult of 
that action. Throughout this entire period we have a 
concern and interest in the child and a desire and inten-
tion to assume the custody of that child, its care and 
maintenance, just as soon as the mothe"r was in a posi-
tion to do so. 
Since the evidence shows that the child will be 
properly cared for and loved in the home of its natural 
mother, ·a further comparison between that home and 
that of its grandparents should be made to properly 
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determine what custody arrangement will best serve the 
child. The Hardcastle home is located in a farming area 
on an 80 acre farm, the school is l% miles away, and 
there is a distinct limitation as to the number of children 
of Janet's age with whom she can conveniently play. 
Ordinarily, a child under such circumstances can look 
to a family unit of which she is a part for playmates of 
her own age, ·but again there is the disadvantage that the 
other Hardcastle children are all older, and we ~presume 
that in view of the age of the grandparents the possi-
bility of addition to that family so far as other children 
are concerned is extremely remote, if not impossible. 
Janet's maintenance has been of questionable quality. 
It has not- been possible, as a practical matter, for appel-
lant to possess detailed knowledge of the treatment of 
Janet, but on those occasions when either DeVon or her 
mother has had an opportunity to see the child, the ca.re 
has left much to he desired. Both women testified that 
on those occasions Janet was dirty, her clothes ill kept, 
and that the child was badly in need of a hath. Mrs. 
Hardcastle would dismiss all of this testimony on the 
theory that a child gets dirty at times, and while it may 
be true that a child does not and cannot remain spotless 
at all times, it is equally true that there is neither occa-
sion nor necessity for Janet to he rep·eatedly found in the 
condition described in detail in the record. There is, 
mo'reover, some confirmation of the testimony of Mrs. 
Oliver and Mrs. Patrick in the condition of the home 
itself. Earl Lowry, an indep.endent witness, testified as 
to his findings at the home in August of 1948, and de-
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scribed the litter of such portion of the house as he could 
see, and also described the yard as having the appear-
ance of a junk yard, cluttered with debris, and a yard 
in which other people were occul;)~yin_g a trailer house. 
The record goes into some detail in regard to these mat-
ters, and shows the advantages of the Oliver home. 
The Hardcastles are people of limited financial 
ability, in sharp contrast to the standing of the Olivers, 
and while this may not constitute a prime factor of con-
sideration, we believe it is an important factor and cannot 
be disregarded. Apparently the farm itself produces very 
little income, and during the year p·rior to the hearing it 
had produced no cash income at all. The children are 
expected to and do work on the farm, with the aid of 
Ordell Hardcastle, her husband being unable to do any 
farm work, by reason of a back injury. 
The record shows there is an affection presently 
existing between Or dell Hardcastle and Janet, but we 
believe this is of limited concern if due consideration 
is given to the fact that the child is now only six years 
old. An intelligent ap·praisal of the welfare of that 
child must consider the custody as it extends into the 
future and not be solely limited to the immediate present. 
DeVon has had little opportunity to really know her 
child, and there has been no chance for a relationship 
upon anything more than a casual visiting basis. The 
record shows Janet is a normal child, who easily adapts 
herself to other children and adults and is actually of a 
happy-go-lucky disposition. We believe it is a certainty 
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that whatever relationship may exist between the child 
and its grandmother will in an extremely short time be 
supplanted with a far more deep and enduring feeling 
of love and affection between the child and its mother. 
Respondent placed great emphasis upon the fact that 
at the time of the Juvenile Court hearing, Janet stated 
she did not 'vant to go to California with her mother, and 
apparently many of the child's statements were simply 
that she didn't want to go to California. Any child of 
such tender years is reluctant to see any change from 
the things with which she is familiar at the moment, 
whatever her surroundings may be, and regardless of 
their future desirability. It must be noted that no real 
attempt was made to explain to the child what was trans-
piring in the Juvenile Court hearing, though she ap~par­
ently had received some intimation of some kind of pro-
ceeding. Her reaction was as normal under the circum-
stances as it was fleeting and subje·ct to change. Within 
a matter of a week or so after she has had a chance to 
acquire a familiarity with her new home and room, when 
a strange bed and furniture are no longer strange to her, 
that feeling toward California will obviously disappear. 
The law recognizes this ,characteristic of young children, 
and it is one of the basic reasons why the momentary 
desires of a child are accorded no weight until they reach 
at least ten years old and have acquired the ability to 
make at least some future forecast in their own mind. 
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For the reasons indicated, it is submitted that the 
judgment of the trial court was in error, and that by 
the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence the 
future welfare of this child demands that her custody 
be awarded to her natural mother. 
POINT NO.2 
This point is directed to the finding of the court 
relative to the Juvenile Court order of :S:eptember, 1944. 
F·or the convenience of this court, the paragraphs ob-
jected to read as follows: 
'' 2. * * * The facts show, and the court now 
finds, that both parents were, by the Juvenile 
Court, deprived of the custody of the child Janet 
because of neglect, and custody awarded by the 
Juvenile Court to Ordell Hardcastle, the inter-
pleaded defendant herein, as aforesaid. At that 
time, the defendant Neldon Hardcastle was in 
the United States Navy, in war service overseas." 
'' 1. * * * That by action of the Juvenile 
Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, on the 13th day 
of September 1944, both parents were deprived 
of the custody of the minor child of the parties 
hereto, and the custody of said child was by said 
court then awarded to Ordell Hardcastle.'' 
It is submitted that the materiality of the action 
of the Juvenile Court order lies in the very narrow field 
of showing the attitude and intentions. of DeVon toward 
her child, and a finding of this character has no proper 
place in this case. It will be recalled that the divorce 
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herein ''""as entered subsequent to the action of the Juve-
nile Court, and that by stipulation of parties as well as 
formal order of the Juvenile Court, the entire juris-
diction over this cause 'vas submitted to the District 
Court herein. No direct attack upon this order was ever 
made by appellant as there was neither occasion nor 
necessity to do so. 
The vice of the finding, however, apart from its indi-
cation of an ill advised con.cern of the District Court 
with the Juvenile Court proceedings, lies in the fact that 
on the surface it might indicate a judicial conclusion, 
reached after mature deliberation and thorough inves-
tigation, that the child was actually neglected. Actually, 
as Judge Clark in his statement indicates, this order was 
simply of a temporary nature until other arrangements 
could be made. It was entered against a background of 
dispute as to the handling of an allotment, and at a time 
when the child's father was in the armed services during 
the course of a war. Moreover, the child's mother had 
no understanding that any custody arrangement was 
contemplated, and stated that she did not receive notice 
of any hearing affectin_g custody. While we believe that 
such a finding is of very limited, if any, materiality in 
this case, if such finding were entered, it should have 
accurately reflected the record and have shown not only 
the fact that the decree was temporary in nature and 
until other arrangements could be made, but also the 
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other facts showing the conditions existing at the time 
this order was entered. 
POINT NO.3 
This point is directed to the finding of the court 
relative to the attitude of DeVon toward her child. That 
finding reads as follows: 
"4. * * * It does not appear that the plain-
tiff owns any property in her own right. There 
were times., before her second marriage, when 
she was able, by reason of her earnings and the 
allotment from the services of her husband, the 
defendant herein, to have contributed to the sup-
port of Janet, and she did not so contribute, nor 
has she contributed since her marriage to Richard 
Oliver. She has visited Janet three or four times 
in the last five years, briefly, but there is no evi-
dence of any great affection on her part for 
Janet, and no attachment or affection on the part 
of Janet for plaintiff. In fact, Janet, on different 
occasions, has shown decided fear that h~r mother 
might take her from the custody of her grand-
mother.'' 
In the first instance the finding recites that De Von 
Oliver has no prop·erty in her own right, which is in a 
sense immaterial, since the problem lies in what property 
she has at her disposal and which will be available for 
the benefit of the minor child. Beyond that, however, 
lies the fact that as a resident of a community property 
state (California) she has a one-half interest in at least 
a generous portion of her husband's p-roperty. 
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The finding then goes on with an assertion that at 
no time did De Von Oliver contribute to the support of 
Janet. This brief has heretofore set out th·e gifts of 
clothing and other items to the child, together with some 
cash. If the finding uses the wor·d contribution in the 
sense of a regular cash payment there is evidenee, 
though other evidence to the contrary, to sup·port this 
portion of the finding. If, however, as we believe, the 
word contribution properly is used in a broader sense 
of money or any other personalty given the child, then 
the finding is contrary to the evidence. 
The finding in its concluding portion states that 
there is no evidence of any affection on the mother's part 
for her child. The early history of the mother's attempt 
to obtain her child, her concern for that child ·during 
later ye·ars, as well as the very act of prosecuting this 
proceedings shows an affection and feeling decidedly 
to the contrary. Any finding in this regard should have 
been to the effect that she had evidenced an affection for 
her child. 
POINT NO.4 
Finding No. 6 (R. 51) of the trial court. reache~ 
a factual conclusion that the ultimate best interests of 
the child will he served by leaving her in the custody of 
the grandmother, Ordell Hardcastle. The considerations 
which lead app.ellant to vigorously disagree with that 
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finding or con,clusion have been detailed in the argument 
set forth in relation to Point No. 1 of this· brief. The 
appellant, therefore, reasserts the argument set forth 
in connection with that point, so far 'as this finding is 
concerned. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the decree of the 
trial court should be set aside, and the custody properly 
awarded to the Mother of the child and appellant herein, 
with reasonable visitation rights to the respondents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S·KEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY 
Attovrneys for Apvellant 
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